When James Comey reopened the Clinton investigation ten days before the election in Octoberand Hillary's lead in the polls started to drop, the "insurance policy" became operational:
The crisis exploded without warning across the sprawling U. Navy community in Norfolk, Virginia: A nuclear submarine and its crew had vanished in the Atlantic.
On May 27,USS Scorpion SSN failed to return as scheduled to its home port at the destroyer-submarine pier complex at the southern end of the waterfront.
From Atlantic Fleet headquarters to dozens of homes and apartments across Hampton Roads, a day of anticipation and celebration had suddenly turned into an open-ended vigil of fear and uncertainty.
Scorpion and its man crew had left Norfolk on February 15 for a three-month Mediterranean deployment. The crew participated in several naval exercises with the U. Sixth Fleet and NATO, conducted ongoing reconnaissance of Soviet naval units in the Med, and paused to enjoy liberty at ports in Italy and Sicily before reentering the Atlantic for the homeward voyage on May Slattery, had radioed Atlantic Submarine Force headquarters early on May 22 that the sub would arrive in Norfolk at 1 p.
Its terse technical phrases meant only one thing: All submarine units surface or remain surfaced until this message cancelled.
For four decades, the navy and U. The full account of its loss has continued to elude and frustrate researchers, journalists, and family members of the 99 sailors who died aboard the sub.
But a careful reexamination of the public record—as well as interviews with former U. Instead, it may have been the outcome of a deadly Cold War confrontation between the U. As documented in press accounts, U. Navy situation reports, and the official court of inquiry convened to probe the incident, by nightfall on that Memorial Day, Atlantic Fleet commander Admiral Ephraim P.
Holmes had ordered what would become the largest U. Officials announced that Vice Admiral Arnold F. Meanwhile, the first members of what would become a task force of nearly sixty ships and submarines and dozens of land-based patrol aircraft raced into the Atlantic that Monday night to search for the missing sub.
For nine days the searchers scoured the ocean from the continental shelf to the Azores, looking for any sign of Scorpion. They failed to find a single clue. Nine days later, on June 5, Admiral Thomas H. In his message appointing retired Vice Admiral Bernard L. After deliberation, the Court shall submit its findings of fact, opinions and recommendations.
Its mandate did not include determining criminal guilt or innocence.
During eleven weeks of hearings—most of them closed to the press and public due to the classified information under examination—the court took sworn testimony from ninety witnesses and reviewed separate exhibits. Two months later came stunning news: On October 30,the navy announced that Mizar had found the wreckage of Scorpion.
In effect, Admiral Austin and his fellow panelists had thrown up their hands. By implication, the court let stand an unstated premise that some unconfirmed mechanical malfunction had sent the submarine plunging to the Atlantic abyssal plain two miles down.
For fifteen years afterward, that was the extent of what the navy, submarine service, Scorpion families, and the public knew about what had happened to the sub and its crew.
Despite the many unknowns that still kept the Scorpion narrative incomplete, on one key point U. Navy officials, reporters, ordinary sailors, and family members had all agreed: Slattery had announced the arrival date and time in an encrypted message to Atlantic Submarine Force headquarters composed late on May Admiral Schade and other staff officers who appeared before the court of inquiry said the same thing: The crisis had begun on May Greene, who as Submarine Division 62 commander in was responsible for Scorpion and three other nuclear attack boats, remained adamant on that point many years later: A second premise on which all officials agreed was that Scorpion had been operating under radio silence following the transmission of the May 21 message, a common practice for submarines at sea.
He disclosed that the Atlantic Fleet had actually launched a highly classified search for Scorpion sometime shortly after May They were due to report in to us shortly thereafter. But then the old submariner made another surprising revelation:Officially, the sub USS Scorpion sank due to torpedo malfunction, but new evidence supports the belief Scorpion was victim of a Soviet antisubmarine attack.
Xcom Week 5 Appendix E Store Operations Messages. Associate Level Material Appendix D E-mail Etiquette Read the following timberdesignmag.com each e-mail: • Describe any content and formatting errors found.• Determine if the content is appropriate for a workplace setting. timberdesignmag.com is the place to go to get the answers you need and to ask the questions you want.
View Notes - XCOM Week 5 Appendix E- Store Operations Messages - Business Letter to Manager from XCOM at University of Phoenix.
will be limited to three days per week and will consolidate. For more course tutorials visit timberdesignmag.comm Week 5 Assignment: Store Operations Messages Due Sunday, March 6 in the Assignment section of eCampus Instructions: 1. Read the scenario in Appendix E. A. Create three messages, following the instructions in Appendix E.
6. Submit the completed messages in Microsoft® .
XCOM Week 5 Assignment Store Operations Messages Memo To Employees Click Following Link To Purchase Assignment: Store Operations Messages Read the scenario in Appendix E. Read the scenario in Appendix E. Create three messages, following the instructions in Appendix E.